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CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE:
PROVIDING ANOTHER FORUM FOR SKEPTICS TO
QUESTION ATIORNEY'S ETHICS
I. INTRODUCTION
The reality of tight budgets and increased caseloads of public
defenders have forced local governments to implement contract systems
as a method for providing assistance of counsel to indigent defendants.'
Under a contract system, private attorneys contract with the municipality
to provide counsel in a specific number of cases at a fixed fee.2
Arguably, when the cost to an attorney to defend a case under a contract
exceeds the fixed fee allocated for that case, the constitutional rights of
defendants are threatened and the ethical obligations of attorneys are
challenged. For attorneys, the issue is whether the contract system
encourages them to expedite cases in order maximize their hourly fee.'
For defendants, contract systems raise the issue of whether the economics of a fixed-fee contract preclude a defendant from receiving effective
"Assistance of Counsel" as required by the Sixth Amendment.'
A. Origins of the Right to Counsel
In 1964, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel in felony proceedings is a fundamental right which applies to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Court held that "in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.''6 Thirty-two
years later, despite the fact that the Court has expanded the right to
counsel, the Court's failure to provide for its enforcement threatens to
1. See infra text accompanying notes 11-13.
2. See infra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
4. The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).

6. Id. at 344.
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preclude the very right it sought to protect.

Eight years after Gideon, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,7 the Court
expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to apply to misdemeanor proceedings based on an imprisonment-in-fact standard!
The
imprisonment-in-fact standard affords indigents the right to counsel in
misdemeanor proceedings in which a loss of liberty is involved; it
requires a pre-trial determination by the judge of whether incarceration
would be imposed upon conviction.9 If incarceration would be imposed,
the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel.'0
B. Evolution of the ContractSystem

Since Argersinger, state and local governments have struggled to
provide effective representation for indigent defendants. Caseloads of
public defenders increased 40% from 1982-1986 and continue to grow at
an alarming rate." Department of Justice reports indicate that more2
than 80% of the defendants filtering through the system are indigent.'
Despite these increases, funds available to provide representation for
indigent defendants has remained unchanged, increased marginally
compared
to the number of cases, or decreased as a result of budget
3
cuts.

In response to the need to provide constitutionally mandated counsel
for indigents more economically, states and municipalities have employed
various forms of contract systems.14 The concept of contracting is not
7. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
8. Id. at 40. Wisconsin does not follow the imprisonment-in-fact standard; rather the
state adopted the imprisonment-in-law standard for use in misdemeanor proceedings in State
ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 249 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1977). Under the imprisonment-in-law standard, a defendant is afforded the right to counsel whenever he or she is prosecuted for an
offense punishable by imprisonment as a matter of statutory law. No pre-trial determination
of whether incarceration is imposed is necessary.
9. Id.; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (upholding the imprisonment in law
standard and announcing actual imprisonment as the defining line in the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel).
10. Id.
11. RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 3-4
(1993).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See Alissa Pollitz Worden, Counselfor the Poor: An Evaluation of Contractingfor
Indigent Criminal Defense, 10 JUST. Q. 613, 613 (1993); Meredith Anne Nelson, Comment,
Quality Controlfor Indigent Defense Contracts, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1988); Richard
J. Wilson, Contract-Bid Programs: A Threat to Quality IndigentDefense Services, iii (National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, March 1982). See also David Doege, Fixed-FeeDefense
for Indigent Raises Fearsof Conflict, Abuse, MILWAUKEE J-SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 1995, at B3
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new.15 Contract systems surfaced in the late 1970's and have experienced
a tumultuous history.16 Under San Diego's contract system, established
in 1978, contracting was the sole method by which the county provided
counsel for indigent defendants. 7 Instead of producing cost savings, the
contract system increased the cost of defending indigent defendants by
32% in three years. Accordingly, county officials abandoned contracting in favor of a public defender office.' 9
Implementation of a contract system involves a jurisdictional
determination of several factors including, but not limited to: the types
of cases subject to contracting, the payment method to be used, and the
rate per case.2° Once these decisions have been reached, the contracting entity submits Requests for Proposals (RFP) to local practitioners.
Contracts are then awarded based on the proposals by weighing criteria
defined by the contracting entity.2' Attorneys awarded contracts then
become contractors under the contracts with the state or municipality.
Although several different types of contract systems exist, a discussion
of each is beyond the scope of this article.' The discussion of issues
raised with regard to contract systems is relevant, however, to all types
of contract systems, though the issues may vary in application based on
the structure of a particular system.23
Scholars and practitioners criticizing contracting assert two main
concerns. First, they argue that a set price per case causes conflicts of
interest and poor representation, and secondly, they argue that contract-

(stating that Wisconsin is adopting a fixed fee contracting system in an effort to reduce the
cost of indigent defense by one million dollars per year).
Any reference to a specific contract system in this article refers to a fixed-fee contract
system such as the one adopted by the Wisconsin State Public Defender's office. See Wis.
STAT. § 977.08 (West 1995-96). Fixed-fee contracting involves contracting for a specific
number of cases at a fixed rate per case. For a detailed discussion of Wisconsin's fixed-fee
contract program, see infra, Part VI.
15. Doege, supra note 14, at B3.
16. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5-3.1 cmts. (1993) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS] (giving background of the results of contract programs utilized across the
country).
17. Wilson, supra note 14, at 3.

18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 5-6.
20. See Robert Spangenberg et al., ContractDefense Systems Under Attack: Balancing
Cost and Quality 16 (NLADA Contract Defense Resource Package, 1982). For a discussion
of the principles involved in implementing a contract system, see infra Part III.
21. ld.
22. For a detailed discussion of the various forms of contract systems, see Wilson, supra
note 14, at 3-18.
23. See infra Part 111(f).
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ing discourages private bar participation in the criminal justice system.'
An additional concern is the potential obstruction of indigents' other
constitutional rights in an attempt to enforce their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel more economically.' Statistics indicate that, frequently, contracting fails to address or satisfy either the fulfillment of a defendant's constitutional rights or the government's economic objectives. 6
Despite these concerns, contract systems represented the largest
percentage growth in defense services from 1980 to 1990 and continue
to gain favor with state governments looking to stabilize the costs of
defending indigent persons.2 7 The National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) have
acknowledged this trend and conceded that, while contract systems are
not favored, they will remain a part of the programs utilized to provide
counsel to indigent defendants.'
Therefore, both organizations
developed guidelines by which contract systems should operate, and each
suggests that contracts should be utilized as a "viable" component of
indigent defense services in addition to a public defender office and a
panel of assigned counsel.29
If contract systems are to remain as part of an overall system which
provides counsel to indigent defendants, the constitutional and ethical
issues raised by contracting must be addressed. Improvements must be
made in order to satisfy the effective assistance requirement mandated
by the Sixth Amendment and to preserve the constitutional rights of
indigent defendants.
24. Howard B. Eisenberg, Criminal Defense in RuralAmerica, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
RURAL AMERICA, 164 (National Institute of Justice, 1982).
25. A defendant who pleads guilty waives the following rights: the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses, the
right to call witnesses, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the right to have the state
prove the defendant's guilt by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to each element of the
crime charged, the right to challenge the arrest, the suppression of physical evidence, the
suppression of identification, and challenges to the sufficiency of the charging instrument. See
Guilty Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights Form (Milwaukee Cty. Circuit Court, 1996)
(on file with author).
26. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 3-6.
27. See Alissa Pollitz Worden, Privatizing Due Process: Issues in the Comparison of
Assigned Counsel, Public Defender, and Contracted Indigent Defense Systems, 14 JUST. SYS.
J. 390, 393 (1991). See also WIs. STAT. ANN. § 977.08 (1995-96) (adopting contract system for
misdemeanor cases in Wisconsin).
28. ABA STANDARDS 5-1.2; See GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES (1984) [hereinafter
NLADA GUIDELINES].

29. See ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3. For a detailed discussion of the guidelines enunciated
by both the ABA and NLADA, see infra part III.
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This Comment examines the constitutional and ethical issues raised
by contracting for counsel to defend indigent persons and discusses
whether contract systems can be utilized effectively to maintain indigents'
rights and minimize potential ethical conflicts. The economic objective
of cutting costs, while always at the forefront of discussions surrounding
contracting, will not be addressed other than acknowledging it as a
motivating factor behind the implementation of contract systems.
Part II of this Comment will examine the constitutional issues that
arise as the result of early disposition of cases under a contract system.
Part III considers the potential ethical problems that arise for contractors
attempting to provide effective representation at a low, fixed cost. Part
IV outlines Wisconsin's new fixed-fee contract system implemented in
1995 and discusses how the history of contracting as well as the NLADA
and ABA Guidelines have impacted the Wisconsin State Public
Defender's office in designing its contract system.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Inherent in any contract system is the danger of compromising
indigent persons' constitutional rights while attempting to enforce their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Critics argue that paying contractors
a flat rate per case encourages hurried disposition of cases, notwithstanding the increased risk that defendants' other constitutional rights may be
sacrificed."0 Statistics indicate that contractors file fewer motions to
suppress, request fewer jury trials, file fewer appeals, and that their
clients enter guilty pleas more often and at earlier stages in the
process.31 The statistics raise constitutional issues in two respects: first,
indigent defendants often enter guilty pleas too early in the proceedings,
and second, defendants' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel, as announced in United States v. Cronic32 and Strickland v.
Washington,33 is threatened.

A. Guilty Pleas
A guilty plea is an admission by a defendant that his or her
actions/conduct satisfied each of the elements of the crime charged in the

30. Spangenberg, et al., supra note 20, at 17.
31. Nelson, supra note 14 at 1152; Wilson, supra note 14 at 16 (citing Norman Lefstein,
Criminal Defense Services for the Poor: Methods and Programs for Providing Legal
Representation and the Need for Adequate Financing (1981)).
32. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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criminal complaint or other charging instrument.' The decision to
enter a guilty plea is, therefore, one of the single most important
decisions in a criminal case. The attorney's role is to inform the client
of his options and the merits of his case. However, the ultimate decision
whether to plead should be the defendant's. 36 The consequences of a
plea are not always apparent to a defendant. It is, therefore, the
responsibility of counsel to inform a defendant of all the consequences
of a plea. In contract cases, cost considerations may force attorneys to
invest less time and effort on behalf of a client or spend less effort
investigating the facts alleged in the charging document, thus denying a
defendant information regarding the consequences inherent in pleading
guilty. Such consequences may include automatic parole revocation
from
37
a prior sentence, or automatic application of a repeater statute.
The Supreme Court has held that in order to be valid, a guilty plea
must be made knowingly and voluntarily and that a valid plea constitutes
a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the
Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and confrontation.38 Once the
knowing and voluntary requirements for a valid guilty plea are satisfied,
the Supreme Court restricts a defendant's challenges to the conviction to
the validity of the plea itself?'
1. Knowledge Requirement
A guilty plea is knowingly entered if the defendant understands the
nature of the charge against him.' In Henderson v. Morgan, the Court
upheld the reversal of Henderson's conviction on the grounds that
Henderson's guilty plea was not knowingly entered." Henderson, who
34. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989).
35. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES § 201 (1988).
36. lL
37. Id at § 204.
38. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-243
(1969).
39. Broce, 488 U.S. at 569 (holding that when a defendant seeks to reopen proceedings
after a conviction from a guilty plea, the inquiry is confined to whether the plea was knowing
and voluntary).
40. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
41. Id. at 647. The Court actually gave the basis for reversing the conviction as an
involuntary plea, but failed to make the distinction between the knowing requirement of
understanding the charge, and the voluntary requirement of understanding the consequences
of a plea including the waiver of constitutional rights. In failing to make that distinction, the
Court inadvertently classifies the understanding of the charge and the consequences as part
of the voluntary requirement. See Id. at 645 & 645 n.13.
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was retarded, pled guilty to second degree murder after his attorney
failed to successfully negotiate an opportunity to enter a guilty plea to
the lesser charge of manslaughter. Although the court instructed
Henderson as to the direct consequences of his plea, the record disclosed
that neither the court nor defense counsel informed Henderson that the
second degree murder charge included the element of intent to kill. The
Court held that Henderson's lack of knowledge of the element of intent
made the plea unknowing and rendered the conviction invalid.42
In a footnote to Henderson, however, the Court stated that understanding the nature of the charge does not always mean that the
defendant must be aware of all of the elements of the crime to which he
pleads guilty: "[t]here is no need in this case to decide whether notice
of the true nature, or substance, of every charge always requires a
description of every element of the offense; we assume it does not."'4 3
This statement leaves the door open for states to determine whether a
knowledgeable guilty plea requires an understanding of the elements of
the charge against a defendant. Such a statement is inconsistent with the
rights waived by a plea and affords the states too much latitude in
determining how to distinguish guilty pleas knowingly entered from
those entered without such knowledge.
This concern is especially apparent in the context of fixed-fee
contracts when contractors already face economic pressures to expedite
cases. For instance, a defendant who is persuaded to plead guilty before
a complete investigation of his case, may challenge his conviction only
on the basis that he entered his plea unknowingly. However, no clear
standard exists for determining what "knowingly" means.
2. Voluntary Requirement
A plea is voluntary if the defendant is fully aware of the direct
consequences of the plea, including the actual value of any promises
made to him by the court, prosecutor or defense counsel, unless the plea
is induced by threats or misrepresentations." The purpose of the
"voluntary" requirement is to ensure the plea is not the result of threats

42. I& at 647.
43. ALaat 647 n.18.
44. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). See also Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243
n.5 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). The Court in Boykin held
that "because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts." Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5.
0
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or promises. 45 However, the Court has upheld guilty pleas obtained
where the state has threatened a defendant with a more serious charge
or more severe penalty if the defendant refuses to plead guilty as part of
the "give and take" of the plea bargaining system.' For example, in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the prosecutor instructed Hayes that if he did
not plead guilty to a forgery charge which carried a potential sentence
of two to ten years, the prosecutor would charge him under the repeater
statute. Hayes later refused to plead guilty, and the prosecutor charged
him as an habitual criminal. The trial court sentenced Hayes to life in
prison. On review, the Supreme Court reasoned that within the
bargaining system the prosecutor must be afforded some bargaining
power.47
In light of Bordenkircher, the voluntariness requirement provides
defendants little protection. Contracted indigent defendants' face an
even greater risk of being unable to challenge their convictions after
pleading guilty if counsel recommends an early guilty plea in an effort
to expedite disposition of the case. The Supreme Court has held that
absent a showing that a plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily,
a defendant may not challenge a conviction based on the constitutionality of the composition of the grand jury,49 or the constitutionality of
previous state convictions used to enhance his sentence.50 Similarly, in
United States v. Broce, the Court held that a defendant also waives his
Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy by entering a valid guilty
plea. 51
Over 90% of defendants are convicted based on a plea of guilty. 2

45.

See WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 933 (1992).

46. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977).
47. 1& at 364.
48. "Contracted indigent defendants" refers to indigent defendants represented by
counsel under a contract.
49. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).
50. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1738-39 (1994); but see Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). The Court in Lefkowitz upheld a state law which specifically
preserves a defendant's right to pursue constitutional claims in habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court found that failure to allow the defendant to appeal his federal constitutional claim
of an illegal search in light of the state law would deprive the defendant of a federal forum
despite having satisfied all the requirements for invoking federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and
would frustrate the intent of the state in providing post-guilty plea appellate review of pretrial
motions to suppress. Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 292-293.
51. 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1988).
52. United States Sentencing Guidelines Ch. 1 Pt. A(4)(c) (1996) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.];
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970); See also LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra
note 45, at 898.
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The Supreme Court's requirement that a guilty plea be knowing and
voluntary does not provide sufficient protections for defendants when
compared to the rights waived by entering a plea. 3 Placing such
defendants within a contract system that encourages early disposition of
cases, then, potentially usurps what little protections may have been
provided by defense counsel.
B. Ineffective Representation of Counsel
Aside from an attack on the validity of the plea, the only remaining
challenge in a defendant's arsenal is a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel 5 4 Since Gideon and Argersinger, the Supreme Court has held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective
assistance of counsel, s and affords indigent defendants the same rights
to effective representation as criminal defendants represented by
retained counsel.56 This right applies to all "critical stages" of a
criminal proceeding, including the first appearance before a magistrate,
the preliminary hearing, the arraignment, and the trial. 7 Until 1984,
however, the Court had never established a standard for effective
representation of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
In Strickland v. Washington," the Court announced that defendants must establish two things to succeed on an ineffective assistance
claim:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction.., resulted from a breakdown
in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 9
Yet experience reveals that this standard is virtually impossible to satisfy.
53. See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 49-52.

54. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989).
55. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
56. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,344-45 (1980) (holding that no basis existed for the
contention that criminal defendants with retained counsel were entitled to greater protections
than those defendants appointed counsel by the court).
57. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 45, at 535.
58. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
59. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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Prejudice Prong

Because a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test to succeed
on an ineffective assistance claim, the Supreme Court has encouraged
lower courts to evaluate the prejudice component first, since the object
of an ineffective counsel claim "is not to grade counsel's performance."' Since the prejudice prong is more difficult to prove, a defendant who fails to meet it would not be allowed to challenge counsel's
performance. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that
there is reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the
defendant would not have been convicted.61
In ruling on whether sufficient prejudice exists, a court may not
consider the possibility of any "arbitrariness," or depend on any of the
"idiosyncracies" of the decisionmaker, even though these factors may
have entered into counsel's mind and affected the performance
inquiry.62 According to the Court, although these factors may have a
significant impact on the outcome of an initial appearance, arraignment,
trial, or sentencing hearing, "they are irrelevant to the prejudice
inquiry. ' Even evidence of the actual decisional process, if not a part
64
of the record, will fail consideration as part of the prejudice inquiry.
The only consideration reached in the prejudice component, then, is
whether the fact finder correctly applied the law to the facts before the
court. 65
The Supreme Court's refusal to allow any of the "arbitrariness" that
accompanies most judicial proceedings into the prejudice inquiry
essentially potentially eliminates what might be relevant evidence in an
ineffective assistance claim. By restricting this "arbitrariness" to the
performance inquiry and encouraging the lower courts to begin with a
prejudice analysis, the Court almost guarantees that such findings,
whether demonstrative of ineffective counsel or not, will never come to
light.
The Supreme Court applied the two part Strickland test to ineffective66
assistance claims arising out of the plea process in Hill v. Lockhart.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

1& at 697.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 695.
Id.
I1&
474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
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In Hill, the Court adopted the objective reasonableness standard for the
performance inquiry6 7 and held that the prejudice inquiry must focus on
whether the errors of counsel affected the outcome of the plea process." In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, a "defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial., 69 The Court compared this analysis to that used for claims of
trial ineffectiveness and gave the following examples:
[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination
whether the error "prejudiced" the defendant by causing him to
plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood
that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change
his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will
depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely
would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the
alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a
potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution
of the "prejudice" inquiry will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.7'
These two examples are completely contradictory to the Court's
previous statement that the prejudice requirement depends on whether
the defendant would have elected to go to trial but for counsel's errors.
The examples indicate that the focal point of the prejudice requirement
is the recommendation of the attorney, and not the defendant's decision.
The 71client, however, has the ultimate decision to enter a guilty plea or
not.
Further, permitting an attorney's word to govern whether his
recommendation would have changed had new evidence been discovered
discounts the possibility that other factors might influence a client's
decision to go to trial when new evidence is revealed. Defense
attorneys, unless privately retained, rarely have the opportunity to spend
enough time with a client in the initial stages of a case to discuss all
potentially relevant facts that might make other defenses plausible.'
67. See infra Part I.B.
68. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.
69. Id
70. Id
71. AMSTERDAM, supra note 35, at § 201.
72. Many of the observations in this article are the result of the author's experiences as
an intern for the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office. As a student, and pursuant to
the Wisconsin Student Practice Rules, the author worked for 9 months in the misdemeanor
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If new evidence were revealed, a defendant might recall facts not
previously disclosed because he or she felt them irrelevant or simply did
not remember. New evidence might also prompt defense counsel to ask
questions not previously relevant in an effort to elicit important
information from a defendant. Asking an attorney to determine, without
knowing the answers to those questions, whether his recommendation
would have changed based on new evidence borders on ludicrous. New
facts based on new evidence might provide leverage for negotiations with
a prosecutor or cause a defendant to choose to proceed to trial in the
hopes of being cleared, even if a plea would be in his best interest.
Requiring such a high standard of proof to meet the prejudice prong,
however, effectively removes the decision to plead from a defendant and
leaves it to the attorney. Placing a contractor in this setting only
increases the likelihood that the defendant will be advised to plead and
allows the prejudice requirement to insulate the attorney from any claim
of ineffective assistance.
B. PerformanceProng
Should a defendant meet the prejudice component, in order to
succeed he must still satisfy the second part of the test. To do this he
bears the burden of establishing that the performance of counsel fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.73 A defendant must
overcome the presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is ...under the
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy."' 74
The presumption created by the Supreme Court is devastating to
indigent defendants represented by contract attorneys. In essence, the
Court presumes that counsel acted reasonably and fails to enunciate any
guidelines for an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, it
effectively creates a roadblock to meeting one prong of the ineffective
assistance claim, and serves to further insulate the contractor from
ineffective assistance claims when his contract encourages a hurried

courts of Milwaukee County conducting witness interviews, advising pro se defendants, and
conducting pre-trial dispositions with defense attorneys. In this author's observations, many
of the misdemeanor cases were resolved (i.e. a plea was entered) after defense counsel met
with a client about their case for less than an hour. Of course, the author was not privy to any
meetings that took place on other occasions.
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
74. Id. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
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disposition of cases.
The Court noted that the inquiry is whether the actions of counsel
were reasonable considering all the circumstances, but stated that
"[m]ore specific guidelines are not appropriate" and that the Sixth
Amendment right "refers only to 'counsel,' not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance."' Instead of announcing particular requirements comprising effective assistance, the Court deferred to
"the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the
law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary
process that the Amendment envisions. "76
The Court looked to the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice as the "prevailing norms of practice,"" but stated that
the Standards are merely guides to determining reasonableness. In fact,
no particular set of rules would suffice to apply on a case by case
basis.7 8 According to the Court, "[a]ny such set of rules would interfere
with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict
the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions."79
Such rules would also "dampen the ardor and impair the independence
of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and
undermine the trust between attorney and client."8"
Despite the Court's failure to establish standards, however, its
deference to the ABA in this regard represents a ray of hope for
indigent defendants represented by contract attorneys. Since states are
free to adopt the ABA standards or establish their own, state bar
associations may adopt standards which articulate minimum requirements
to protect contracted indigent defendants from being summarily
processed through the system. However, should states fail to adopt
guidelines which articulate the boundaries within which counsel must
operate, one of a defendant's only available challenges to his conviction
may be lost.
Given the magnitude of the constitutional rights waived by a
defendant who pleads guilty,8 the Court has created such burdensome
obstacles to challenging the plea that they simply cannot be reconciled.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
entering

1&. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
See supra note 25 for a list of the constitutional rights waived by a defendant by
a guilty plea.
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Moreover, looking to the Supreme Court for relief on this issue is a lost
cause. Reconciling these two issues would require expanding the means
available to defendants' for challenging guilty pleas, and opening the
floodgates to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, the
Court leaves the decision
to the states to provide greater rights to
82
defendants.
indigent
C. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In addition to threatening defendants' constitutional rights, a guilty
plea may also impact on the length of a defendant's incarceration under
the federal sentencing guidelines. Under these guidelines, the range of
a possible sentence in federal court is determined by calculating two
coordinates on a grid.83 The first coordinate is determined by calculating the offense level.'
The second coordinate is determined by
calculating the defendant's criminal history 5 A defendant's criminal
history is based primarily on the number and nature of the defendant's
past convictions as well as the length of imprisonment for each offense.16 The two coordinates are then used to locate the range for
sentencing on the grid. 7 Under the federal guidelines, then, a failure
by a contractor to negotiate a lesser charge because he or she failed to
investigate the facts of a case may severely impact a repeat offender
charged in federal court, resulting in a much longer sentence. 8
III. ETHICAL ISSUES
While contract systems raise issues related to indigent defendants'
constitutional rights, such systems also challenge the limits of the ethical
standards imposed on the legal profession. Contract systems raise ethical
issues in the context of both their implementation and their execution
that may adversely impact the attorney's ability to ensure quality
representation as required by the Sixth Amendment. 9 Both the ABA

82. Many states have responded by enacting statutes that preserve defendants'
constitutional challenges to a plea for hearing on a post-conviction motion. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 976.04(1) (West 1993-94).
83. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 (1996).
84. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(b) (1996).
85. U.S.S.G. § 1B.1(f) (1996).
86. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (1996).
87. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.1(g-i) (1996).
88. Give example here of how offense charged and offense plead to may have different
impacts on future sentence under Guidelines.
89. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 19-21.
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and the NLADA have developed standards addressing the role of
contracting in indigent defense representation. In 1984, after a four-year
effort and with the cooperation of the ABA, the NLADA promulgated
the Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Governmental Contracts
for Criminal Defense Services. In 1990, the ABA added Part III,
entitled Contract Defense Services, to Chapter 5 of the Standards for
Criminal Justice. Both the ABA Guidelines and the NLADA Standards
encourage the use of contracts only as a component of indigent defense
programs and urge strict compliance with the guidelines to ensure
effective representation." Part IV of this comment follows with a
discussion of Wisconsin's fixed-fee contract system adopted in 1995 both
to briefly explore the evolution of contract systems and to determine
whether the strict guidelines established by those two agencies have
trickled down to the state level to ensure that effective representation. 9
A. Standardsfor Awarding Contracts
One of the primary concerns with respect to contracting is establishing standards by which contracts can be awarded. In 1984, in State v.
Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down the low-bid contract
system employed by Mohave County as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 92 Mohave County's contract system awarded contracts solely on
the basis of the lowest bid submitted without regard to attorney
qualifications, caseload, or the types of cases each attorney was expected
to handle.93 The court also held that Mohave County's system violated
the existing ABA Standards and the newly established NLADA
Guidelines by failing to consider the time each attorney would spend on
a case under the contract, and by omitting support costs for investigators,
paralegals and law clerks. 4
Both the ABA Standards and the NLADA Guidelines prohibit the

90. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 977.08 (West 1995-96) (adopting contracting for misdemeanor
cases in Wisconsin).
91. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 977.08 (West 1995-96) (adopting contracting for misdemeanor
cases in Wisconsin).
92. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984). Only one bid was ever rejected by
Mohave County's system. The attorney who submitted the rejected bid had been the subject
of repeated complaints and was held in contempt for failing to file an appellate brief. Id. at
1379.
93. att at 1379.
94. 1d. at 1379-81.
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awarding of government contracts solely on the basis of cost.95 Instead,
the standards require that the contracting entity consider the following
factors to ensure quality representation: the categories of cases the
attorney will handle under the contract, the term of the contract,
identification of the attorney to perform legal representation under the
contract and a prohibition of substitute counsel without prior approval,
specific workload standards, minimum levels of experience, a policy for
conflict of interest cases and the provision of funds necessary to resolve
such conflicts, limitations on the private practice of law outside the
contract, and reasonable compensation levels and a designated method
of payment. Both organizations also call for sufficient support services
and reasonable expenses for investigative services, expert witnesses,
supervision and professional development, protection of client confidences, a system of case management reporting, and grounds for termination
of the contract by the parties.96 These requirements are designed to
ensure that contracts are awarded to competent attorneys, and that
competitive bidding under low-bid systems will be eliminated.
B. Length of Contracts and Payment Schedules

The length of contracts for indigent defense has been cited as a
potential problem contributing to poor representation of indigent
defendants by contract attorneys. Jurisdictions utilizing one year
contracts may experience "lag" time between the date of RFP submissions and the date contracts are awarded. This "lag" time may create
tremendous chaos in a system where defendants, who require counsel,
must go before a judge with counsel within 48 hours of arrest.9 7 The
95. ABA STANDARDS 5-3.1; NLADA GUIDELINES preamble & IV.3.
96. ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3.
97. Wilson, supra note 14, at 19. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the
constitutional right to counsel at the initial appearance. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a); Argersinger,
407 U.S. at 37 n.5. A defendant who remains incarcerated after arrest (warrantless) must
appear before a judge within 48 hours. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991). In a contract system where a defendant must be assigned counsel, "lag time" may
occur while the assigning agency processes the paperwork to assign counsel, counsel is
assigned, counsel accepts the assignment, is notified of the pending court date, and finally
appears in court. This "lag time" may result in a delayed initial appearance, or a defendant
appearing without counsel. Because bail is usually addressed at the initial appearance, a
defendant without representation may remain incarcerated even though he can post bail.
Contracting does not present a "lag time" problem in Milwaukee County (Milwaukee,
Wisconsin). In Milwaukee County, two public defenders are assigned to share the load in
representing each defendant that appears without counsel in Intake Court (the initial appearance in Milwaukee County) as well as conduct an indigency review. The public defender then
notes in the file whether an attorney should be assigned, and the appropriate action is taken
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NLADA Guidelines suggest that a two-year contract is "an absolute98
minimum" for establishing independence and stability for the attorney.
Contracts of a duration longer than one year also provide the funding
source and the contractor sufficient time to evaluate cost and quality.99
While a contract with a large number of cases may appear to be cost
effective during the first few months of operation, this occurs because
many easy cases are disposed of up front."° Costs skyrocket later,
when more complex cases proceed to trial. Shorter contracts allow for
less time to plan for such a dramatic shift in costs."'
Payment schedules can also place serious burdens on the implementation of a contract system if not well conceived. In San Diego's now
defunct contract system, contractors received payment upon final
disposition of a case."° This system created enormous cash flow
problems for contractors attempting to pay salaried employees and
overhead costs. °E
C. Conflicts of Interest
High on the list of ethical considerations are the potential conflicts
of interest raised by contracting. Conflicts may arise in two ways:
through representation of multiple defendants under the same contract,
or when heavy caseloads create a conflict by forcing an attorney to chose
between zealously representing a paying client or channeling efforts into
the representation of the contracted indigent defendant." NLADA
Guideline 111-13 addresses conflicts of interest and states that a contract
"should avoid creating conflicts of interest between the Contractor or
individual defense attorney and clients."' 5 The ABA requires that
to ensure counsel will be provided at the next date.
98. NLADA GUIDELINES 111-4; GUIDELINES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
DELIVERY SYSTEMS, Cal. (1990). The ABA Standards make no recommendation on the
length of a contract.
99. Spangenberg et al., supra note 20, at 17.
100. Id
101. See Id.
102. 1L
103. Iti
104. Wilson, supra note 14, at 20.
105. NLADA GUIDELINES 111-13. The Guideline states, in relevant part:
The contract should avoid creating conflicts of interest between the Contractor or
individual defense attorney and clients. Specifically:
(a) expenses for investigations, expert witnesses, transcripts and other necessary services
for the defense should not decrease the Contractor's income or compensation to attorneys
or other personnel; and
(b) contracts should not, by their provisions or because of low fees or compensation to
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contracts contain a policy for conflict of interest cases and the provision
of funds outside the contract to compensate conflict counsel for fees and
expenses.'O°
Representation of multiple defendants may pose an actual conflict of
interest as opposed to the potential conflicts created by the fact that the
attorney will receive only a predetermined fee. Where actual conflicts
arise, ethics standards require a contractor to withdraw from representation.1°7 However, conflicts created by burdensome caseloads are not
as easily resolved. Instances may arise in which a contractor faces
pressure to work on two separate cases, one for a contracted indigent
defendant, and one for a paying client. The fixed rate may encourage
the contractor to forego an indigent defendant's case in favor of a paying
client. Both the ABA and the NLADA have attempted to avoid these
potential conflicts by recommending caseload requirements and
restricting the practice of law outside the contract." s However, success
in avoiding conflicts depends in large part on the moral fiber of
contractors who must acknowledge existing conflicts or accept only as
many cases under a contract as they are equipped to handle.
D. Support Services, Monitoring Contractors,and ProfessionalDevelopment
Inadequate support services, failure to monitor contracts, and failure
to provide for training and professional development have also caused
problems in contract systems. In State v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme
Court cited the lack of support services, including insufficient access to
investigators and paralegals, as well as the failure of the County to
monitor caseloads as two reasons for striking down Mohave County's
contract system."° ABA Standard 5-1.4 requires that a legal representation plan provide for "investigatory, expert and other services
necessary to quality legal representation... at every phase of the

attorneys, induce an attorney to waive a client's rights for reasons not related to the client's best interest; and
(c) contracts should not financially penalize the Contractor or individual attorneys for
withdrawing from a case which poses a conflict of interest to the attorney.
Id
106.
107.
represent
108.
109.

ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3.(b)(vii).
See, e.g., WIS.SUP. CT.R. § 20:1.7(a) (West 1996) (stating that [a] lawyer shall not
a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client).
See ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3(b)(v), (viii); NLADA GUIDELINES 111-6 & 111-12.
See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1379 (1984).
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process."' 0 Standard 5-1.5 requires that a plan also provide for the
effective training and professional development of all counsel providing
defense services, and Standard 5-3.3 requires sufficient support services
as an element of the contract."'
Provisions for support services, monitoring contractors, and continued
professional development are extremely vital to the survival of a contract
system providing quality representation. Critics of contracts assert that
a fixed-fee system enables young, inexperienced attorneys to take on
contracts to jump-start their careers at the cost of indigent defendants'
access to quality representation." 2 Often, these young attorneys,
whether operating in a firm or as sole practitioners, do not have the
resources or the practical experience to provide quality representation
for defendants. The ABA requirements, if adopted by the states and
followed by them in the execution of contract systems, can, at a
minimum, establish that resources will be available to contractors.
Monitoring contractors regularly is important to force accountability and
to prevent contractors from obtaining contracts merely to turn a profit.
Requiring continuing legal education (CLE) ensures that contractors will
remain current on the latest developments in criminal law and encourages a sharing of experience and knowledge with other contractors. Such
a sharing of information is crucial to the implementation and development of a successful contract system.
E. PrivateBar Representation
Contract systems are also criticized because they fail to encourage
participation from the private bar."3 The nature of contracting
requires that, to be effective, economies of scale must be utilized in
awarding contracts. This system, therefore, has the effect of awarding
contracts to a small number of firms or practitioners rather than
dispersing the cases throughout the private bar, as occurs with a system
of appointment. The ABA Standards of Criminal Justice require private
bar participation as fundamental to the makeup of any legal defense
plan, but suggest that participation may include contracts for services in
addition to a coordinated assigned counsel system and a full-time
defender organization." 4 It is also important to note that jurisdictions

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

ABA STANDARDS 5-1.4.

ABA STANDARDS 5-1.5 & 5-3.3. (b)(6).
Spangenberg et al., supra note 20, at 17.
Wilson, supra note 14, at 20; Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 164.
ABA STANDARDS 5-1.2(b).
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with a public defender as the primary provider of indigent defense have
limited the number of opportunities available for members of the private
bar to represent indigent defendants. 15 The level of private bar
involvement also depends on whether a particular jurisdiction contracts
for all types of cases, -or retains some assigned counsel provisions.
According to the ABA, the ideal plan for providing legal defense in a
jurisdiction utilizing contracts does retain some appointments to private
'
counsel, even if only to cover conflict of interest cases. 16
F Fixed Fees
By far, the most important factor contributing to the ethical dilemmas
facing contractors is the fixed fees paid to attorneys on either a per case
or per contract basis. Critics argue that fixed costs encourage hurried
disposition of cases, thereby encouraging attorneys to deny indigent
defendants' their right to effective assistance of counsel in their effort to
turn a profit. 7 Both the ABA and the NLADA have adopted
standards which require reasonable compensation for attorneys under
contract."1
ABA Standard 5-3.3 requires reasonable compensation
under contracts as well as a designated method of payment." 9 The
NLADA suggests compensation for attorneys at a rate which reflects
customary compensation in the jurisdiction for similar services, the time
and labor required by the attorney, and the degree of professional skill
and experience of the attorney.12
Arguments concerning fixed rates generally arise in the context of
systems that contract either for all cases of a particular type in a
jurisdiction for a specific period (i.e. all misdemeanors in Milwaukee
County for 1996), or for every case in a jurisdiction requiring appointment for a specific period of time.121 Contracts which include all cases
in a jurisdiction for a period of time often fail to project the number of
cases that will be assigned during the contract period. As a result,
caseloads are often much higher than anticipated." Contractors, then,

115. Spangenberg et al., supra note 20, at 18.
116. ABA STANDARDS 5-1.2.(b).
117. Doege, supra note 15, at B3; Waring R. Fincke, Implementation of Public Defender
Flat Rate Contracts: An Ethical and Client-Centered Approach in 2 1996 MIDWINTER
CONVENTION 459-60 (State Bar of Wisconsin 1996).
118. ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3 (ix); NLADA GUIDELINES 111-10.
119. ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3.(ix).
120. NLADA GUIDELINES 111-10(b).
121. Spangenberg et al., supra note 20, at 17.
122. KLEIN AND SPANGENBERG, supra note 11, at 4.
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are faced with having to provide quality representation on a significantly
increased number of cases for the original fixed rate. Such a situation
may encourage a contractor to dispose of cases in a hasty and unethical
manner." Following applicable ABA Standards and NLADA Guidelines regarding caseloads for contractors will reduce the likelihood that
contract attorneys will be tempted to compromise ethical representation
in order to make contracting profitable. 4
IV.

WISCONSIN'S FIXED-FEE CONTRACTING SYSTEM

In 1995, after the Wisconsin State Legislature mandated the use
contracts in an effort to shave one million dollars a year from the cost
of defending indigents, the Wisconsin State Public Defender's office
implemented a contract system for misdemeanor cases."z Wisconsin's
new system is a far superior to many similar systems enacted in the past,
and provides inherent protections for contracted indigent defendants.
Under Wisconsin's first contract in the new system, entitled Contract
#95, the SPD considers six separate categories of criteria in awarding
contracts and assigns points to each category: qualifications/experience
(25), ethical track record/reputation (20), proposed cost per case (10),
ability to handle cases (30); financial stability (10), and facility (5).Y

123. Spangenberg et al., supra note 20, at 17.

124. ABA

STANDARDS

5-3.3(b)(v); NLADA

GUIDELINES

111-6 & 111-12.

125. Doege, supra note 14, at B3; See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 977.08 (West 1995-96). The
statute provides, in relevant part:
(3)(f) The state public defender shall enter into as many annual contracts as possible,
subject to par. (fg), with private local attorneys or law firms for the provision of legal
representation. Under any such contract, the state public defender shall assign cases...,
shall set a fixed-fee total amount for all cases handled and shall pay that amount except,
that the state public defender may not pay an attorney more for a case that he or she
would receive according to the rates under sub.(4m). The contract shall include a
procedure authorizing the state public defender to make additional payments for a case
or to reassign a case if the circumstances surrounding the case justify the additional
payment or reassignment.
(3)(fg) The total number of cases that may be subject to the annual contracts under par.
(f) for a given year may not exceed 33% of the total number of cases at the trial level
that are assigned by the state public defender to private counsel under this section for
that year.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 977.08 (West 1995-96). Although the statute authorizes contracts in all
types of cases, the State Public Defender issued contracts only in misdemeanor cases otherwise
appointed out through the private bar appointment process. See State of Wisconsin-Office
of State Public Defender, Request for Proposal for Private Bar Fixed-Fee Contacting Part I,
§1.1, Attachment A: Wisconsin Contact #95 [hereinafter "Contract #95"]. Other types of cases
will continue to be appointed to private bar attorneys under Wis. Stat. § 977.08.
126. Contract #95 RFP Part I, § 1.25.
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Each category is subdivided into as many as six elements and requires
a comprehensive outlay of the firm or practitioner's resources and
experience in handling State Public Defender (SPD) appointments.
Contract #95 includes all the elements required by ABA Standard 5-3.3,
except for specific workload standards and limitations on the practice of
law outside the contract."2 7 Contract #95 also includes the contracting
parties as suggested by the ABA."z
Wisconsin's Contract #95 requires a significant amount of information
regarding a contractor's experience, past caseload and available
resources."2 That information should provide the SPD with a stable
basis for awarding contracts to qualified criminal defense attorneys with
the experience to know how many cases they can handle and at what
cost. In accordance with ABA and NLADA Guidelines, under Contract
#95, a contractor is required to identify and report any case which, in his
or her professional opinion, constitutes a conflict pursuant to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules.' 3°
Contract length and payment schedules under Wisconsin's system are
also in line with NLADA standards."' Contracts under the new
system run for a two-year period. 131 Under the payment schedule, two
months of the projected annual payment of a contract is paid as an
advance on the day a contractor begins representation under the
contract.133 Thereafter, the contractor bills the SPD every two months
for all cases opened, and payments thereon are adjusted by the SPD to
recoup the advance."M A final bill is tendered at the end of the
127. Contract #95 does, however, limit the number of cases an attorney may contract for
to the number permitted for a public defender under Wis. Stat. Ann. § 977.08 (West 1995-96).
Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Part I(h). As of January 1, 1993, the misdemeanor caseload
for an assistant public defender was reduced from 492 to 411. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.08
(5)(b) & (5)(bd) (West 1995-96). This number is just slightly over the standards recommended
by the National Advisory Commission. See ABA STANDARDS 5-5.3 commentary. With regard
to minimum levels of experience, the SPD requires that each attorney be SPD certified under
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § PD 1.04 (July 1995) to receive cases. While no limitations are placed
on contract attorneys for practice outside the contract, a monitoring of the number of cases
an attorney or firm had the previous calendar year is required with submission of a proposal.
See supra note 87.
128. ABA STANDARDS 5-3.2; Contract #95 1.
129. See supra note 87, and accompanying text.
130. Contract #95 Part i(f); Wis. Sup. Cr. R. § 20:1.7 (West 1996); see NLADA
GUIDELINES 111-13; ABA STANDARDS 5-3.3. (viii).

131. See NLADA GUIDELINES 111-4.
132. Contract #95 RFP Attachment A, Part II. The term of Contract #95 ran from
approximately July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1997.
133. Id. at Part III(b)(i).
134. Id. at Part III(b)(2)-(3).
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contract for any remaining charges owed under the contract."' This
method allows a buffer for the contractor's start-up costs while ensuring
that the contractor is paid only for the actual number of cases completed.
Wisconsin's Contract #95 also contains provisions for support services,
monitoring contractors, and professional development as required by the
ABA.'36 Contract #95 requires contractors to meet certification
requirements for each type of case handled, and requires the completion
of fifteen hours of CLE each calendar year, six of which must be in
criminal law courses approved by the SPD 37
Support services are also provided for under Contract #95.138 To
receive approval to hire an expert, an investigator, or approval of any
other expenditures associated with routine discovery or transcripts, an
attorney must submit a request to the SPD detailing the nature of the
39
case and the impact the expert or expenditure will have on the case.1
The form requires a detailed breakdown of costs and requires a
recitation of all action taken on the request by the SPD.' 4 The
Contract does, however, provide that with the exception of the above
services, all remaining costs associated with representation are to be paid
from the fixed-fee under the attorney's contract. 4 '
Wisconsin has also added a component to contracting not previously
utilized. The SPD employs two full-time auditors of contractors who
travel throughout the state monitoring contractors beginning six months
after a contract takes effect. 42 Contractors are required to give full
cooperation to the auditors under the terms of their contract. 143
Contract #95 also requires contractors to maintain time sheets for each
case detailing the time, date, resources used, and any unusual costs
incurred in the case. These time sheets must be submitted in support of
each bi-monthly billing.1"
However, Contract #95 conflicts with the ABA suggestions in that it

135. Id. at Part III(b)(4).
136. See ABA STANDARDs 5-1.4, 5-1.5 & 5-3.3.
137. Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Part VI.
138. See Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Exhibit C, Request for Approval to Hire
Expert or Investigator.
139. Requests for transcripts under Contract #95 are to be completed separately. See
Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Exhibit C, State Public Defender Request for Transcripts.
140. Id.
141. Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Part V.
142. Interview with Frederick H. Miller, Deputy State Public Defender, State of
Wisconsin, in Madison, Wis. (Jan. 30, 1996).

143. See Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Part IV.
144. Id. at Part XVI.
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does not provide funds to cover CLE. Forcing contractors to comply
with these CLE requirements out of their own pocket tests their
commitment to providing quality representation to indigent defendants.
Contractors who are simply out to make a profit from contracting will
find the costs of CLE prohibitive, especially if they maintain a diverse
practice and must earn CLE credits in other areas as well.
The fact that Wisconsin utilizes this form of contracting only for
misdemeanor cases leaves the assigned counsel system intact for all other
types of cases. 45 Private bar participation, then, remains an integral
part of indigent representation in Wisconsin, although on a smaller scale
than before the implementation of contracts for misdemeanor cases.
Under Wisconsin's plan, fixed-fee contracting remains as an essential
and necessary ingredient in stabilizing costs for indigent defense.
Wisconsin contracts with attorneys for a fixed number of cases at a fixed
cost per case.1' 4 The total value of the contract equals the rate per
case multiplied by the number of cases awarded under the contract. The
rates payable to contractors under Wisconsin's system vary by county.147 Each potential contractor receives a breakdown of the rate paid
per case by each county as part of the RFP and bases all budgeting on
that fixed rate. The rates per case for Contract #95 vary from $147
(Columbia County) to $525 (Richland County). Costs are determined
based on figures from attorneys practicing in each county and from
county public defender offices.14
Critics continue to question whether contractors can provide quality
representation at these rates. 49 In response to these questions, the
SPD stated the following:
[I]t has long been the position of the State Bar of Wisconsin
that private bar attorneys who accept case appointments at
[fixed rates] per hour often contribute pro bono time in such
cases in order to provide competent representation. Following that presumption, it is certainly possible that contracting
lawyers might make pro bono contributions in cases with
inadequate funding ... There is every reason to believe that

145. See Contract #95 RFP, Part I § 1.1.
146. Contract #95 RFP, Attachment A, Part I(a).
147. See Contract #95 RFP, Attachment C, Private Bar Contracting Cost Schedule.
148. Interview with Frederick H. Miller, Deputy State Public Defender, State of
Wisconsin, in Madison, Wis. (Jan. 30, 1996).
149. See Letter from Daniel L. Shneidman, Chair Committee on Professional Ethics,
State Bar of Wisconsin, to Nicholas L. Chiarkas, Wisconsin State Public Defender (June 30,
1995) (on file with the Wisconsin State Public Defender).
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contracting lawyers would be just as likely to offer pro bono
services or to zealously explore alternative avenues for
funding experts, etc., as other private bar and staff attorneys.'y
While the SPD acknowledges that a contract system certainly gives rise
to a cost versus quality concern, the fact remains that the State of
Wisconsin is in the midst of a legislative push for decreased costs in
providing for indigent defense.'
The SPD does not condone a
compromise to quality representation, but rather advocates that such
representation must now be achieved under more constrained costs.'52
V.

CONCLUSION

While the implementation of contract systems certainly gives rise to
several constitutional and ethical concerns, such concerns are not new.
The compromise of indigent defendants' constitutional rights has long
been a problem in this country and will continue to be regardless of the
existence or nature of contract systems. Similarly, conflicts of interest
are inherent in the practice of law, and have existed in the practice of
indigent defense since Gideon and Argersinger. Representing poor
people has never been a money making venture; lawyers willing to give
their time to represent indigents have historically been undercompensated.
The question of whether contractors will expedite cases or enter into
contracts solely for profit will always remain, as will the threat of actual
and potential conflicts of interest inherent in any system designed to
provide legal representation to indigent defendants. However, a blanket
statement that contracting will lead to any greater threat of ethical
violations invites the presumption that all attorneys are unethical. And
to begin with, that presumption would threaten to cripple the entire
criminal justice system. Such a presumption is completely at odds with
the Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v. Washington,"' in which
the Court found that a defendant must overcome the presumption that
an attorney acted reasonably to meet the performance requirement for

150. Letter from Sally Mayne Pederson, Legal Counsel, Wisconsin State Public
Defender, to Daniel M. Berkos, State Public Defender Board (Aug. 10, 1995) (on file with the
Wisconsin State Public Defender).
151. Doege, supra note 14, at B3.
152. Doege, supra note 14, at B3; Interview with Frederick H. Miller, Deputy State
Public Defender, State of Wisconsin, in Madison, Wis. (Jan. 30, 1996).
153. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

1078

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1053

an ineffective assistance claim."M An opposite presumption would
open the floodgates to litigation by unhappy defendants that would
overwhelm our courts.
Certainly, contracting prompts further inquiry into these ethical
concerns as well as the impact on a defendants' constitutional rights.
However, economic pressures will continue to force the implementation
of contract systems. Therefore, the path to minimizing these problems
lies in designing and constantly modifying systems to construct as many
protections as humanly and economically possible.
The success of such an endeavor will require the cooperation of
government, judges, public defenders, district attorneys, contractors, the
private bar, and state bar associations (ethics committees). The
Government must begin by allowing for a slow and steady implementation process. Economic objectives must be realistic, and incorporate an
initial outlay of funds and a plan to recoup losses at such time as costs
stabilize. The private bar must be willing to participate in the system
both in the capacity of representation and by providing feedback on the
implementation of programs. Better cooperation between district
attorneys, public defenders, and contractors could expedite almost every
aspect of the process, saving countless hours and dollars for all parties;
dollars that could be devoted to enhancing the compensation and
support services available for attorneys representing indigent defendants.
In theory, Wisconsin's new contract system appears to abide not only
by the guidelines suggested by the ABA and the NLADA, but also
provides several layers of protection to ensure that defendants'
constitutional rights are not unfairly compromised and that potential
ethical violations by attorneys are minimized. Consistent with ABA
directives, the State has shied away from competitive bidding schemes,
choosing instead to require a detailed dossier from potential contractors
and considering proposed bids as only 10% of the value of a proposal.
Contract #95 includes provisions to provide for ample support services,
intensive monitoring of contractors, and establishes a payment scheme
that allows a buffer for contractors incurring start up costs when
undertaking contract representation.
The effects of Wisconsin's contract system will not be detectable for
at least a couple of years. However, like all contract systems, its success
in providing quality representation at a fixed cost rests largely on the
shoulders of contractors. In the long run, only they will know whether

154. Id. at 689.
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they provided their clients effective representation as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.
KELLY

A.

HARDY*

* In appreciation for their encouragement and assistance in preparing this article, I
would like to thank Professor Christine Wiseman of Marquette University Law School and
Frederick H. Miller of the Wisconsin State Public Defender's office. Thanks also go out to
Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann, Deputy District Attorney Robert
Donohoo, Assistant District Attorney Karen Lynch, Assistant District Attorney Laura
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